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ISSUES 
ISSUE 1. 
Was Appellants Claim Properly Dismissed by Summary Judgment for Failure to Exbust the ISCI 
Grievance Process? and were Appellants Entitled to a Trial by Jury? 
ISSUE 2 
Were Appellants Constitutional Due Process Rights Violated? 
ISSUE 3 
Do Appellants have Legitimate Claim for Harassment and Retaliation? 
ISSUE 4 
Did the Defendants Actions Violate Double Jeopardy and Should the District Court Have Made a 
Ruling on the Issue? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF lTE CASE 
William Lightner (Henceforth WL) Co-Appellant Pro Se is incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional 
Center (ICC), Kuna, Idaho. He is incarcerated for pleading guilty to one (1) count of LC.18-1508 (Ada 
County case No. HCR 20701). He is serving a sentence of three (3) years fixed, with seventeen (17) years 
indeterminate, and will complete his cumulative twenty (20) year sentence in December 2014. 
Marcia Lightner (Henceforth ML) Co-Appellant Pro Se, lives at 300 E. 41' Street, Garden City, 
Idaho 83714 and has been legally married to WL since 30 December 1997. 
In 1992 Rotundo and Nowak wrote a Treasure on Constitutional Law 37 (2nd Ed. 1992). These 
authors explained how a vague statute permits an officer to exercise discretion to enforce the statute 
selectively. 
"The discretion is most dangerous when the law regulates a fundamental right, 
such as speech or travel, so that the officers may be subjectingpersons to arrest 
and prosecution either because they disagree with message which the person 
wishes to covey in his speech or for some other constitutionally suspect reason" 
The same can be said about prison settings. Vague Directives describing the prison Policy and 
Procedures (P&P) or their standard operating procedures (SOP) must be clear. Otherwise, day to day 
operations would be left up to the discretion of each individual oacer. Rules would change from unit to 
unit, and even from shift to shift. If this were the case, chaos would rule. 
In this particular case, past prison Directives were actually changed specFtically aimed at harming the 
Appellants. Now, unclear written Directives have led to multiple, operational P&P interpretations. Because 
of the vagueness in P&P, Appellants' rights have constantly undergone impetuous attacks. This case, and 
this appeal, will show how Constitutional rights mean little to those in authority when not governed and 
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regulated by clear and concise Directives meant for everyone. If not clear and concise, selective prosecution 
comes into play, thus violating an individual hisher Constitutional Rights to due process and equal 
treatment. 
Appellants have never asked for anything special. A11 they have ever wanted, is to have normal, 
uninterrupted visiting compatible to that of everyone else. And, to be afforded the Constitutional Right to 
due process that is due them as U.S. citizens. Yet because DOC opposed Appellants getting married, 
administration has done everything possible for the last twelve (12) years to hinder and separate Appellants 
with consortium. When Directives are written so that individuals are treated differently based on the 
"Discretion" of those in power, uniformity it is replaced by objectivity, and members of unflavored groups 
suffer. 
Appellants have brought an action to this court in an attempt to restore some common unity in their 
visiting, with that of other visitors. On face value, the case appears simple. Appellants have claimed I-Due 
Process, 11-Harassment, 111-Double Jeopardy violations, against the Defendants. Appellants have filed 
evidence of this in the complaint, and are looking for relief and restitution. Appellants paid their filing fee 
and requested trial by jury. The issue is not whether they would ultimately prevail, but whether they were 
entitled to offer evidence and support the claim to a jury of their peers. Young v. Citv of Ketchurn, 137 
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P3d 1157, 1159 (2002). Even though the court is not bound to accept Appellants 
statements as true legal conclusions, they must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. 
A-. 478 U.S. 256,286,106 S.Ct 2932,2944 (1986). 
Of the three (3) claims Appellants made in the complaint, only the first one of Due process violations 
was responded to. Without the demanded trial by jury being allowed, the court instead dismissed the case 
over issues the Defendants created. For instance, Appellants contest how Defendants can argue whether a 
particular Defendant is liable in the case, as a justification to dismiss the entire case (See Record 000076-77 
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and 000080-81). Appellants offered much more than mere, vague, and conclusory auegations. Appellants 
now appeal the decision of the lower court, and ask that this case be remanded for trial by jury they 
demanded. 
Defendants, on the other hand, motioned for a dismissal and received it via a ruling for summary 
judgment (see record 00071). In this Decision, the court lists examples that the "Lightners have a history of 
violating,facility policies" (see record 000072-73). These EXAMPLES are the same issues Appellants 
want to present to the jury to justify their harassment claim (see record 000038). While the Defendants offer 
no proof or factual evidence these truly were disciplinary offenses, Appellants have affidavits and live 
witness testimony from other visitors to present the jury that these were incidents of harassment rather than 
policy violations. Additionally, because these incidents were video recorded by direct order of the deputy 
warden, the recordings from visiting will show these as acts of harassment and not disciplinary violations. It 
is unclear why this determination was a matter for summary judgment and not an issue for a jury? 
Summary judgment was also granted in that, "... a loss of consortium claim based upon alleged 
violations of civil rights fails as a matter of law." (see record 00082). Although loss of consortium was 
mentioned by the Appellants, it was not one of their three (3) issues. 
Finally, the only semi legitimate issue of concern defendants had for summary judgment, was that of 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requirements. Yet This should have been overlooked due to 
warden Hardison's actions and vagueness of the Directive. The case Iaw provided wiIl show why, as this is 
covered in detail within the Brief itself. 
Appellants request that this case be remanded for trial by jury. On the surface, it appears the District 
Court issued its Order believing that the disciplinary issues were not harassment or retaliation, but 
justifiable. This should have been a jury decision. In White v. Fauver, 19 F.Supp 2d 305 (D. NJ 1998) 
allegations were made that prison guards fabricated misconduct charges in order to create the appearance of 
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'a justification for mistreatment. The court ruled that the claim was cognizable because he bad not been 
afforded the Constitutional right of due process. Without having received an institutional hearing, and 
without being able to present unanswered claims or issues to a jury, Appellants, have also not been afforded 
due process. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
ML was employed by Swansons Commissary for five (5) months from April to August 1997. She 
made commissary deliveries to various IDOC facilities as a contract vender (she was not a State employee). 
Due to complications with her position, and having a desire to have a stronger relationship with WL, MI quit 
her job. In spite of IDOC counselors attempts to dissuade her, she married WL five (5)  months later in 
December 1997. (see record 000033) Because ML did not follow the counselors demands and 
recommendation to dissolve the relationship and marriage plan with WL, IDOC officials have taken a 
personal vendetta in attempting to extinguish that marriage. 
Visiting is an important part of Appellants relationship. Constant communication keeps it strong. 
Although many marriages disintegrate because of incarceration and separation ML would not allow that to 
happen to her marriage. In twelve (12) years she has not missed a visit she was allowed to attend. She 
weeMy drove hundreds of miles when WL was transferred across the state. During winters she would 
sometimes have to drive through snowstoms and blizzards. Even weather did not stop her, she always 
made it there. Even after having full knee replacement surgery, ML visited her husband the day she left the 
hospital. 
IDOC officials did not approve of Appellants marriage, because ML had been a contract bender. 
Appellants requested the court to take Judicial Notice of this information and date, because this is the information and date the 
state is now using in the 2009 June visiting termination. 
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When they realized that her dedication and stead fast love was not going to dwindle they devised another 
plan. With malicious animosity they filled WL's file with lies. They fabricated disciplinary offence reports 
(DOR) for reasons to restrict visiting. A number of times, harassment grew to the point that Appellants filed 
officer misconduct complaints. The IDOC records show various menial DOR's against WL. They do not 
show the fast number of falsely reported incidence that were dismissed. Although DOC officials they argue 
these were not fabricated, it is a statement of fact, that the majority were dismissed. Not all h a t e s  were 
faced with these problems. Appellant's case is very atypical. WL was serving a 3 year fixed sentence fro 
lewd conduct with a minor. By that i&ct alone, WZ was a member of a disfavored group, while the majority 
of ofilcers treated him fairly, there were those who automatically harassed him, and provided bigoted 
treatment. It can be factually stated as a member of a disfavored group know as "sex offenders" horriflingly 
dreadful treatment can be found nationwide. Boise Idaho is no exception, prejudicial treatment was 
directed toward Appellants. 
It is factually documented in sworn to in numerous affidavits that the DOC treatment facilitator 
wanted WL to openly admit guilt not only to dismissed charges but to the intent of future crime. Having no 
such intent, WL refused. He openly admitted guilt to his charged offence and participated in the programs. 
That was not good enough. Because of his refusal to admit guilty intent to future crimes he was classified 
as being in a "state of denial", and a high risk to re-offend. 
Even with a three (3) year fix sentence, with this documentation, WL was not considered for parole 
until his eleventh (1 1) year of incarceration. Then, because of the documentation and classification, WL 
was labeled as a VSP. With this new label, WL was infamously promoted to the worst of the worst. This 
labeling targeted WL for harassment insipidly vile treatment from other inmates, and some officers alike. 
When visiting, Appellants were continually singled out. They were atypically assigned a table right 
in front of the visiting officer. Through snide comments and disparate treatment they were singled out for 
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selective prosecution by staff. 
2 As WL was released on parole, registration requirements posted his name, picture, and address in the 
local paper and other media. With unfortunate fate, WL's picture ran side by side with that of Joseph 
Duncan's. A man who had just kid happed and killed a family in Northern Idaho. The parole ofkicer and 
members of the community were in a rage. When it reached the point that a gun was held at ML's head 
threatening death, W1, took his wife and absconded out of fear for their lives. 
This caused the community alarm. His picture was repeatedly broadcast on local channels 
throughout the following days. He was even placed on the national TV show "Americas Most Wanted" at 
least three times. With all the murder and crime occurring daily in the US, Wl, was amazed he was even 
being looked for, considering his crime only carried a 3 fixed sentence and was commuted to a "Rider" 
With all the negative media WL was returned to IDOC custody and told to top out his sentence with 
no further chance of parole. Upon WL's return to ISCI, from September 2005 through 2008, the majority 
of officers treated WL as a normal inmate, however, it only takes a very select few to sabotage a file with 
dire and unfavorable reports. It was these few, acting in prejudicial manner, which attacked WL through 
artificial violations and ML with false accusation on visiting behavior then wrote false documentation and 
derogatory statements in Appellants visiting file. 3 
Many of which were exaggerated responses of ML's clothing or her disability permit in her car 
window, or the way she kissed her husband good by in visiting to playing board games in the visiting room, 
aud other different issues. ISCl officers created a negative file and used everything possible to termination 
2 In violation of P&P ML would be asked to leave before most local visitors, even though she had driven around 200 
miles to get there. It was this type of continuous actions towards Appellants that showed an atypical prejudicial, disparate 
treatment. 
3 A few officers had written WL seven1 DOR's which caused sanctions to reshict visiting, In appealing to Warden Blades, many of 
these DOR's. were dismissed and removed from the record. One was upheld restricting visits for 30 days and another was revised not affecting 
visits. (It i s  important to mention fhis DOR hadnofhing ever to do with anything Appellants did while a t  visiting). 
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Appellants visiting, and because there is no P&P in place for due process, Appellants and others are 
powerless over protecting their due process rights. It was these few officers that displayed actions of 
selective prosecution towards Appellants with atypical conduct as if they had committed the Duncan 
Murders, and treated Appellants with persod vindictive actions rather than the professionalism they so 
brag about and document all over their web cite and institutions. 
Appellants filed several formal complakits with Warden Blades and the Ethics Department at the 
IDOC about the harassment. Shortly thereafter, Appellants, visiting Sgt. McIntire, and officer Greenland had 
a meeting in 2006 and discussed the harassment issues. All parties came to an agreement to start off on a 
new slate. However, the harassment did not stop? Visiting continued until ML's arrest in April 2007. 
Three (3) months aRer ML's April 10,2009 arrest she wrote a letter to warden Blades (See Exhibits 
in record) asking him to reinstate their visiting. Although the charge was still pending, warden Blades 
reinstated her visiting with the condition that she keep ISCI up to date of any changes in her case. Due to 
attorney postponements, ML's preliminary hearing was not held until one year later. Then she accepted plea 
agreement to probation for a misdemeanor conviction. 
Appellants visited for thee or four months without any problems or security concern until warden 
Blades was replaced by warden Hardison. ISCI officials discussed Appellants visiting and ML's arrest with 
4 ML has spent many years working with organizations that help and supports inmates in and out of prison. In January 
2006, she met a women that asked her for some assistance with a place to stay when she was released This individual was 
eventually the cause of ML's arrest April 10,2007, and is currently hack in prison with a new escape charge. Taking 
responsibility for her own actions, and not reviewing all the facts about this individual case, ML pled guilty to a misdemeanor 
obstructing justice. She had allowed this person to stay in her home not knowing what she had done. ML was under the belief 
that this individual was fully released and discharged from the system. However, she had been lied to. This person provided 
false legal documentation on her discharge from the system. Instead of confirming the documentation given to ML, she just 
believed this person. ML received two (2) years probation, one supervised and one unsupervised. ML has complied with her 
probation very successfully without any issues or problems. She will be completely released from probation in March 2010. 
Appellant's ask the court to take judicial notice of this information. ML's Visiting a t  ICC was terminated again 
6-09, because ML worked as a commissary worked 12 years ago at SICI. After ML's visits were approved June 2008 by 
warden Valdez, (knowing of her April arrest and 2007 visiting termination and ML's misdemeanor probation he 
approved her visits in June 2008. Appellants have filed a 1083 lawsuit November 2009 on this termination, 
(case No.CV-OC09-19120). 
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Hardison and he once again terminated her visiting privileges. No due process or hearing was affbrded 
Appellants. (See Transcripts Mls argument). 
WI, received written termination of visits by the institution, and ML received a letter from warden 
Hardison (See record00070). -- 
MI, tried to appeal to Direct Reinke at DOC, however, the appeal was intercepted by Jeff Zumada 
that acted for Mr. Rienke. Director Reinke's reply (???) was that he stood by Hardisons decision regardless 
of what warden Blades ruled regardless of Appellants Liberty Interest. Having no further institutional 
recourse, Appellants filed this action in district court 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE 
WAS APPELLANTS CLATM PROPERLY DISMISSED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST THE ISCI GREIVANCE PROCESS? AND WERE APPELLANTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This claim is atypical in nature as to the fulfillment of the PLRA requirements as far as most inmate 
claims filed are concerned. The grievance system is designed so that the person of least responsibility and 
closest to the incident of concern is assigned the first step of the process. If a resolution can not be obtained 
which satisfies the inmate's issue, a formal grievance may be filed to a "Reviewing Authority" as the second 
step. If still unsatisfied with the reply, the inmate may take a third step and appeal the decision to the 
Warden as the institutions facility head, and final "Appellant Authority". 
What makes this claim atypical, is that it was warden Hardison himself acting as the "final appellate 
authority" who answered and responded to the initial concern. (See record 000070) The IDOC Directives 
list the steps necessw for normal proceedings, but they give absolutely no direction in grievance procedures 
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when the facility head, acting as the final authority, answers the initial concern. 
B. ARGUMENT 
Appellants claim that Directive 316 is unconstitutionally vague in this issue. It is so confusing an 
untrained, Pro se litigant can not comprehend it. In fact, one can not even find in the Policy and Procedures 
Directive the steps to take following the warden answering a concern form. Much less try to interrupt 
Directives that are not there. Being so atypical, the PLRA decision in this case should be reversed and the 
case remanded back to the district court to rule on the issues presented, and allow Appellants their 
demanded right to trial by jury. 
It is well established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of 
confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code 5 19-4206; 42 U.S.C. 
§1997(a); Drennon v. Idaho State Correctional Institution, 145 Idaho 598,602, 181 P.3d 524,528 (2007). 
1. OffenderhJon-Offender Recopnition: 
IDOC Policy Number 3 16 begins with (05.0 1.00) "...the offender grievance procedure may be used 
to address complaints ... " 05.02.00 continues by stating "The written offender grievanceprocedure shall be 
readily available to all employees and offenders. " ML is nether an employee nor an offender. She 
therefore is not bound by the rules established by the PLRA. As an Appellant in the complaint, and not an 
employee or offender, PLRA exhaustion rules do not apply, and should not have been considered for 
summary judgment. Directive Number 316.02.01.001 (page 2 of 7) further goes on to state under 
DEFINITIONS: 
" O f f e d r -  A person under the legal care, custody, supervision or 
authority of the Board including a person within or without the state 
pursuant to agreement with another sfate or contractor." 
The district court did not attempt to dismiss WL, who is an offender, as an Appellant for failure to 
exhaust PLRA requirements. Instead, the lower court used the PLRA requirement to dismiss the entire case 
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by s u m m q  judgment in spite of the fact that ML was not bound by PLRA requirements. 
2. Procedure: 
The United States entire governmental system, uses three (3) individual branches (executive, 
legislative, and judicial) using a system of checks and balances. Even the President is bound by those 
checks and balances and is liable to impeachment. In this case, the IDOC has attempted to throw the system 
of checks and balances out the window and disregard it. By the condition of the case, the defmitions of the 
directives, and the manner in which the events took place, Appellants claim that the Directive itself is 
exceptionally vague and poses questions of legality. 
Directive Number 3 16.04.00.00 (pg 2 of 7) lists these def~t ions:  
Reviewinp Authoritv- The Deputy Warden. 
Aupellate Author& - The Facility Head. 
Facilitv Head- The person with primary responsibilities to oversee manage or operate a 
Department facility (Also referred to as Warden). 
Directive Number 316.02.01.001 Lists the offender grievance process as a three (3) step procedure, 
verified by the affidavit of Jill Whittington. In this case, Appellants argue and contend that not only is the 
Directive vague, but is con.tradictory in nature and unconstitutional. Therefore, good cause showing, WL 
should have been either granted time to amend the PLRA exhaustion requirement, if so stipulated, or the 
requirement should have been entirely dismissed. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide in Rule 15(a) that 
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requi~es. '" 
The first step in the grievance process is to file a concern form. According to directive 316 the 
second step is to file a grievance. It specifically states in step two (2) (at 316.02.01.001 page 3 of 7) that 
"All offenders grievances shall be treated as confidential and viewed only by staff on a need to know basis, " 
Page five (5) continues with "The grievance shall befiled within$ifteen days of the incident or problem that 
is the basis for the grievance. The reviewinp author* (Deputy Warden) may ... " Furthermore, the 
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Directive goes on with "The offender must state the action that the offender believes the reviewing 
authorin, (Deputy Warden) should take. " 
WL first attempted to file a normal grievance through the unit office as most grievances are typically 
done. This was rejected and returned to him by the unit officer, telling him that the "Wardens decisions are 
not grievable." (See record, Affidavit of William Lightner dated 9 Dec. 2008 page 3, paragraphs 11 thru 13) 
This left WL with an unavailable remedy for completing the PLRA grievance procedures. See, LaFauci v. 
New Hamushire D.O.C., 2005 WL 419691 at 14 (D.N.H., Feb, 2006) 
This alone created an estoppel to exhaust the PLRA requirements. The initial complaint and concern 
form (step one (1)) was created by the decision and action of the Warden, or facility head, as the primary 
person involved. The Deputy Wardea, in a subservient position to the Warden does not have the power or 
authority to override his decision. Therefore, the grievance has zero percent chance of being approved or 
granted. The "REVIEWTNG AUTJ3ORITY" does not have the necessary authority. Also, by policy, the 
grievance issue is confidential. Without having the necessary authority to override the Wardens decision, 
the "Reviewing Authority is therefore NOT on a "need to know basis," as states in Directive 3 16. 
In the case of US. v. Makowski, 20 F3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1997). The court ruled that Due Process 
requires a statute to be sufficiently clear so as not to cause persons of common intelligence necessarily to 
guess at its meaning and to differ as to its applications. Using this d i n g  as the established law, it can only 
be ruled that the IDOC visiting Directive 3 16 is therefore vague. It does not specifically list a procedure for 
grieving the warden. Additionally, as was pointed out by Interrogatory, and in open hearing, the Director's 
office does not get involved in the grievance procedure (see 22 Dec. 08 hearing, transcripts pages 55 to 56). 
Therefore, it leaves the procedure to ones imagination and own interpretation. It violates the established law 
set in Makowski in that Directive 316 is not sufficiently clear. It leaves a person of common intelligence 
guessing as to what the proper procedure is. 
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The Defendants have also argued in district court that by continuing with the grievance process, the 
Warden would have had the opportunity to "change his mind." (See Transcripts dated 22 Dec. 2008 pg 41) 
To this, the written Directive continues with "lfthe grievance is correcllyfilled out, the grievance shall be 
assigned to the most applicable stafi but not the same staff who responded Po the concern." bg.5 
Directive 3 16.02.01.001) Because the concern form and notice was issued by the Warden as "the facility 
head" and Appellate authority (See Record 000070), the Directive becomes vague as to the procedures WL 
needed to take and, if PLRA requirements still existed. A grievance obviously cannot be approved by 
someone not having authority to do so. No one at the facility had the power to overrule the Wardens 
concern form or official letter and grant the grievance, which is still only step one (1) of the process. And, 
by Directive 316, it cannot go to the Warden again, giving him a chance to "change his mind" as 
Defendants have suggested. Because, he is the staff person who responded to the concern form and would 
violate the written Directive if he responded to the grievance or appeal. 
In addition, c o n f i g  Appellants point in answering the initial concern form and writing a formal 
letter, (see record 000070) warden Hardison did not sign it with his normal signature block. Nor did he 
answer as if it were a concern form. He left no room for a grievance or appeal. He violated the three step 
grievance procedure by answering the initial concern form as if it were the third step of the grievance 
process. Warden Hardison specifically wrote that in this f is t  step he was acting as the fmal "Appellant 
Authority." This written statement alone was clear enough to the Lightners mind to have completed the 
grievance process according to the guidelines established in Makowski. To continue further in the grievance 
process without a clearly written Directive at this point was to guess at its meaning and application. 
Defendants argue that "Next, there is nothing in the IDOC grievance policy that prohibits an 
offender j?om grieving a wardens decision. " (See Transcripts pages 50 lines 13 25, pg. 5 1 lines 1-25, pg. 
52, lines 1-12, pages 53,54, 55; warden Hardison names himself Appellate Authority). As explained by the 
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U.S. Supreme Court in Woodford v. Npo, 126 S.Ct 2378,2388 (2006): "The benefits to exhaustion can be 
realized only if the prison grievance system is given a ,fair opportuni ty..." (Defendants "Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for S w a q  Judgment." Dated 15 Dec. 2008, page 6) Yet 
- in Woodford, there was a grievance system and Directive in place. IDOC Directives do not have a Policy in 
place to grieve a concern form answered by the warden. The policy does not exist, and therefore, the 
Directive is vague and open to individual interpretation. 
Defendants Reply Memorandum continues with "It is important to recognize that exhaustion allows 
prison oficials an opportunity to resolve dispules concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before 
being haled into court. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 9 10, 9 14 (2007). In this case, exhausting the grievance 
process would have given Warden Hardison the opportunity to reconsider his decision." ( id  page 3) 
Defendants Reply was an admission cofirming that the P&P Directive is vague and contradicts 
itself. Although the Directive states that the same staff member who answered the concern cannot act as the 
Reviewing Authority, Defendants interpretation is that Warden Hardison was to answer the concern, the 
grievance, and the appeal, giving him two more chances to "reconsider his decision". Granted, the Directive 
does offer an option to forward the grievance, but only at the Wardens request. And by the main ofice's 
P&P they do not get involved in grievance proceedings. For all intent purposes, it removes all checks and 
balances installed as the basis for the grievance system. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs attempted to complete the grievance process without a clearly written 
Directive, in that a formal appeal was sent via the U.S. mail to Director Reinke at the DOC main office. 
This was followed up by ML attempting to make an appointment with Director Reinke. The appeal remains 
unanswered to this day. The appointment was denied with the reply that Director Reinke does not get 
involved in the prison grievance process or procedures. Also, that Warden Hardison's decisions, as Warden 
and head of the facility are final. His decisions will not be reconsidered or reversed. 
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Having no written Policy and Procedure in place for grieving a wardens decision as the initial contact 
person makes the directive incomplete and therefore vague, creating an estoppel to WL. By Directive 316, 
Warden Hardison can not review his own decisions. No other person within the institution can ovemde his 
decision as facility head, and the Directors office would not accept the appealing grievance.. 
3. Entitled to a Juw Trial 
One of the most fundamental rights possessed by Americans is the Constitutional right to a trial by 
jury. In filing this complaint, Appellants demanded the trial by jury they were entitled to (See 
record.000042). In response, counsel for Defendants also demanded a jury trial (See record 00044). As 
pointed out throughout this appeal, there are many issues of material fact in dispute. While still in 
controversy, the court has automatically and unconstitutionally accepted Defendants debatable statements 
and incidents reported as fact. They failed to consider that these "accepted statements" are highly disputed 
and a major source of the claimed harassment. Without even considering Appellants claim, the court made 
its decision without hearing Appellants side of these events. The court based their decision solely on 
Defendants reply brief (See record 000021) and disregarded the trial by jury both parties had demanded. 
The issues in dispute were meant for a trial by jury, where evidence could be presented and witnesses 
could testify. Unfortunately, the court has denied Appellants that right. Oddly enough, of the three (3) 
issues presented, two (2) still remain unanswered, or even mentioned in the courts ruling. For the court to 
deny the fundamental right to due process and a trial by jury guaranteed by law, for the sake of expedience, 
is showing the same prejudicial treatment toward a member of a disfavored group that Defendants have 
shown. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF- 19- 
ISSUE TWO 
WERE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although visiting may be considered a privilege, the loss of a privilege is punishment. To loose that 
privilege with out due process is unconstitutional. Appellants claim that in suspending their visits, 
Defendants should have provided them with a due process hearing. Why should the loss of "visiting" 
privileges be treated as any less, or any different, than when other idiactions cause the loss of privileges to 
occur, and/or sanctions to be imposed? Another matter of interest, is that not only was a due process 
hearing not automatically scheduled, but when Appellants requested a hearing, the request was denied. 
With the suspension of Appellants visits, it must be noted that they were not allowed to challenge 
any evidence used against them; They were not allowed to offer evidence in their own behalf; and, They 
were not allowed to cross examine adverse testimony against them. The decision was completely arbitrary 
in nature and not appealable. Thus the only approach Appellants saw in reestablishing their visits, or even 
receiving a hearing, was through the court, hence, the filing of this action. 
Although not considered by Appellants, another way was possible. It must also be especially 
recognized that after WL was transferred to ICC, his visiting and consortium privileges were restored. ML 
visited with her husband each week for an entire year without any incidents or noted security concerns to the 
institution. However, when she submitted her yearly renewal form, as all visitors are required to do, her 
visiting privileges were again terminated. This occurred again without a hearing, without prior notice, and 
ordered due to issues in this claim. ML attached physical evidence that her arrest had been reduced to a 
misdemeanor. Appellants pointed out that P&P for misdemeanor offences are different than those of felony 
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terminations, regatdig the time a person has to wait before they can re-~isit .~ 
B. ARGUMENT 
1. The Directive is vaxue and unconstitutwnal: 
The Directive was not written or used in a Constitutionally legal manner. Conh.01 Number 
604.02.01.001 visiting @g. 6 of 25) is quoted as: 
Terminafwn of Visitinx Privileres "Visiting privileges may be 
terminated at the discretion ofthe facility head or designee for any 
length of time, including permanently, for violation or attempted 
violation of any state or federal law, any board rule, policy and 
procedure, SOP, field memorandum, or failure to follow staff 
instructions. " 
According to the United States Constitution a person is innocent until proven guilty. The IDOC 
directive states that privileges may be denied for "a violation", or "attempted violation7'. Yet without a plea 
or conviction, Appellants privileges were denied on mere allegations. This means, that lDOC personnel 
claim the right to judge and convict a person as guilty, without a hearing, based on their own perception of 
what an "attempted violation" is. They make these decisions without full knowledge, and from hearing only 
one side of the event. Appellants were not allowed a due process hearing to: 
a. Rebut testimony or evidence used against them; 
b. Present evidence in their own behalf; 
c. Cross examine witnesses defendants had (if any); or 
d. be present for the discussion and decision. 
Witb the current practice and interpretation of what an "attempted violation" is, the Directive is 
being used in contrast to the Constitution. The Directive goes onto say that those with "felony arrests" 
' The given reason for ML's 2009 ICC visiting termination appears to be lacking, and displays a weaker foundation to justify the 
actions of IDOC officials. The reason for the denial changed during the grievance process. Now ML is being denied because 
she had worked as a contract vender for Swanson's commissary over twelve (12) years ago (see Appendix F) Even though she 
never worked as a State employee nor did she ever work at ICC. 
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within the last five (5) years can be denied at the discretion of the facility head. Meaning, a person could go 
to trial and be found innocent of the charge, and yet still be denied visiting because of the arrest. 
In Appellant's case, ML plead guilty to a misdemeanor and received probation. Her visits were still 
suspended by Warden Hardison because it had been a "felony arrest." Defendant Hardison made it clear in 
both the Defendants response (see record 000070), and in his personal aEEidavit that his decision is 
completely discretionary and based on ML's arrest, NOT her conviction. Appellant's claim, and bring the 
issue to the higher court on appeal that the Directive, and Defendants use thereof is unconstitutional and 
violates the established innocent until proven guilty law provided in the Bill of Rights. 
2. Avuellants were enfitled to a hearinp: 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293 
(1995) was adopted into Idaho law with the case of Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573,930 P.2d 603 (1996), 
to determine when a prisoner has a protected liberty interest. ". . . States may under certain circumstances 
create liberty interest which are protected by the Due Process clause. " 
Appellants claim they had a created liberty interest protected by Due Process! When Appellant's 
visits were originally suspended, they began the standard grievance process. After a three (3) month 
suspension, ML wrote a letter to warden Blades. He granted that request and reinstated her visiting 
privileges, creating a liberty interest. This created liberty interest not only entitled them to resume their 
visitation privileges, but also separated their case from that of Sandin or Schevers. The court held in @gg 
v. Selskv, 238 F.3d 223 (2"* Cir 2001) that a liberty interest was created when only 92 out of 795 days were 
spent in a special housing unit in determining if the inmates status imposed an atypical and substantial 
hardship. The high court found it inappropriate and remanded the case for full review of his confinement. 
In the present case, visits had been reinstated, Appellants had resumed their weekly visiting for four 
(4) months. Without further incident or change in status, their visits were in October 2007 again arbitrarily 
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suspended for ML's previous April 2007 "arrest". This creates an atypical hardship. Inmate offenders are 
entitled to due process in all areas of prison life. While ML is not an inmate, she should have been entitled 
to a due process hearing prior to her visits being suspended again as well. 
In the case of Neal v. C~muer ,647 S.W. 2d 923 (Mo. App. 1983) An inmate filed action with the 
courts after visits with his wife were restricted. His claim was essentially the same as the Appellants claim 
in this case. Sanctions were imposed without affording procedural due process in that no hearing was held. 
As in this case, prison officials had written the wife informing her that her visiting privileges were 
suspended. She was not given a hearing were she could call witnesses, or to confront her accusers. Neither 
did she receive written notice of an infracted violation. The court ruled that a hearing is necessary before 
spousal visitation can be terminated. 
Another case substantially involving the same issues as Appellants was s led on in Czaika v. 
M-, 708 F. Supp. 253 E.D. Mo. 1989) A prisoner and his wife brought an action alleging that certain 
disciplinary measures were taken by prison officials without affording due process of law. The plaintiff 
sought a preliminary injunction. Following the denial of an injunction and reversal of that denial on appeal, 
the district court found that the prisoner and his wife were entitled to a preliminary injunction requiring 
prison officials to remove a stop order from the wife's visiting and releasing the inmate kom the special 
adjustment unit. 
There are regulations in place that require the facility warden to detail reasons for placement of an 
inmate in ad-seg. This status review process for inmates housed in ad-seg creates a liberty interest protected 
by due process Tillier v. Fields, 230 F.3d 502 (2nd Cir. 2000). Likewise in this case, Appellants claim that 
their reestablished visiting created a liberty interest which is protected by due process. Ln fact, a prisoner's 
due process rights can be violated even if no cognizable liberty interest was lost. For example, it was ruled 
that Due Process was violated when a disciplinary hearing board convicted an inmate of escape without 
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evidence of inmates guilt being presented. Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771 (9* Cir. 1999). MI, 
had not yet been found guilty or convicted of any crimes when her visits were originally suspended, she was 
still awaiting trial. Recognizing this flaw, warden Blades revoked the suspension and reestablished 
Appellants visiting. Without change in her court status, and without a hearing, warden Hardison referred to 
the "Felony arrest" from six (6) months previous to arbitrarily suspend her visits again. Even the rational 
relationship test will not sustain conduct by state officials that are malicious, irrational, or plainly arbitrary. 
Wedges Lockerv v. Keyfetz, 91 7 F.2d 1 150, 1 155 (9" Cir. 1990). 
Earlier, Defendant's based their entire PLRA argument on WL only. They totally disregarded ML's 
existence in the complaint, yet Defendants, in isolating their defense solely toward WL, must realize that the 
denying or taking away privileges from an inmate is considered punishment. That in so doing, without due 
process, also creates an atypical hardship. Appellants though have not filed this case meant to be isolated to 
one party or the other, but to the Lightners as a whole. They are a legally married couple and have been 
since 1997. 
In 2000, the 10" Cir. Ruled that Due Process protections apply to all prisoners deprived of life, 
liberty, or property. Chambers v. Colorado DmL of Corrections , 205 F.3d 1237. This application is 
accepted and used in most every state. Appellants feel it should also be used as the standard in Idaho for 
this case. 
Quoting blacks law dictionary, the term "property" can be defined as, (1) "the right to possess use 
and enjoy a determinate thing; the right of ownership. (2) "Any external thing over which the rights of 
possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised". 
Different people may place completely different values on a particular item. For example, if 
everyone used the same value on each item, their would be no such thing as an auction. Appellants place a 
very high value on their marriage, their ability to communicate and see each other, and the opportunity to be 
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together. To Appellants, their marriage and visiting privileges were a property of great value. Because their 
marriage and relationship has value and is owned by them it can be, (by Blacks Law Dictionary definition) 
considered property. Therefore, taking visiting away entitles them by law to due process Abbott v. 
McCotter, 13 F3d 1439 (10" Cir 1994)". Appellants had visited four (4) months before the suspension was 
reapplied. There was no emergency issue that required instant action. Additionally, requests for a hearing 
were denied even after the suspension was implemented. Furthermore, ML has not been proven a security 
risk. The burden of proof remains on IDOC to reasonably justify suspending her visiting privileges. Burden 
of proof should also fall on IDOC to justify an atypical, permanent suspension. For IDOC officials to 
arbitrarily make these decisions without a hearing, is contrary to due process. 
The district court may, or may not have made a favorable decision following ML's suspension had 
visits not been reinstated concerning a liberty interest? But, by the fact visits were reinstated for four 
months after the initial suspension, a liberty interest was definitely created. M e r  reviewing its own decision 
in 788 F.Supp 1012 the court ruled in Gavin v. McGinnts, 866 F.Supp 1107 (N.D. IL 1994) that denial of 
visitation to the sister of a prisoner, deprived prisoner of his civil rights. That the state statute creating a 
liberty interest in visitation had to be determined by whether visiting had been clearly established at the time 
of the alleged denial. In the case at hand, as applies to appellants, the Lightners have been manied for over 
twelve (12) years. They have visited at every institution WL has been housed at. Once warden ~ l a d e s ~  
reinstated the Lightner's visits ML did not miss a visiting opportunity. In fact, Marcia has never missed a 
visit with her husband unless her privileges were interfered with by the institution. Appellants visiting was 
well established prior to Defendant Harrison's enacted denial of allowing ML to visit. They had been 
visiting for years prior to the suspension, and for four (4) months after the original suspension was lifted 
Warden Blades was the warden of ISCI at the time of ML's arrest. Warden Hardison took over as ISCI warden after warden 
Blades had reinstated ML's visits. 
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(record Exhibit in, Visiting log attachment to warden Hardison's Affidavit). 
It is well known and understood that parole is a privilege and not a right. Yet every offender has a 
right to due process at a parole hearing. Every inmate offender is also entitled to a due process hearing when 
given a disciplinary offence report @OR). In the case of Walker v. Sumner, 14 F3d 1415 (9" Cir. 1994) 
when due process was violated, summary judgment was also precluded. The same should hold true in this 
case. Also, if a person, in either instance is denied their due process right, they become owner of possible 
1983 action Henw v. Sanchez, 923 F .  Supp 1266 (C.D. CA 1996). Likewise, visiting is also considered a 
privilege and not a right. Allowing an individual to have the power and authority to take visiting privileges 
away without due process is contrary to the standard rules of practice and Constitutional law. It creates an 
unchecked dictatorship which disagrees with a democratic system. The same consideration and guidelines 
should have been afforded Appellants, as those afforded a potential parolee or disciplinary offender. A 
potential parolee or disciplinary offender would not have been denied parole or punished without a hearing, 
Appellants should not have been denied visits without equal due process. 
In 1992 a prisoner brought a section 1983 action against administrators and correctional officers at a 
prison to recover for violation of procedural due process in connection with suspension of visitation 
privileges. The US District Court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and the prisoner appealed. 
The court of appeals found that Washington's prison visitation regulations created a due process liberty 
interest and thus the visiting rights could be suspended under an enumerated list of circumstances only after 
finding of guilt pursuant to a regular disciplinary hearing. Mendoza v. Blod~ett, 960 F 2d 1425 (9" Cir. 
1992) 
3. me Loss of Consortium: 
In a prison setting, safety, control, and order are priorities. When these priorities are endangered, 
staff has to take immediate action. But, there were no new offences demanding an immediate rush for the 
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Lightners visits to be suspended again and again. Furthermore, a hearing was denied even after the 
restrictive sanctions were imposed. The court held that "Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, 
hdamental to our existence and survivat" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Being separated by 
incarceration, visiting privileges are a major substance of the Appellants marriage. As one of the '%basic 
civil rights of man" Appellants should have been given a hearing before restricting their marriage beyond 
necessary means. 
The US, Supreme Court ruled that marriage is an associational right, ranked as "of basic importance 
in our society" M.L.B. v S.L.J. 117 S.Ct. 555 (1996). In the ease of Coleman v. Turner, 838 F.2d 1004 (81h 
Cir. 1988) a female prisoner and future husband were denied visiting privileges and among other things, 
claimed harassment. The jury agreed with the claim, and they were financially compensated. Appellants 
have already discussed the value of their maniage and visits. Separation puts a strain on any relationship. 
This loss of Consortium not only strains the marriage, but affects Appellants in other ways as well. 
Defendant's, by denying visitation, have denied Appellants any and all private legal communication 
in preparing court documents or a plan of procedure in developing a legal strategy for their court cases. All 
communication has been reduced to State recorded phone calls and pre-inspected mail which can be 
photocopied at Defendants will. By the loss of consortium through visitation, Defendants effectively delay 
and hinder legal communication and receive an unfair advantage in possessing Appellants legal strategies. 
As joint Appellants, the Lightner's should have some form of legal communication equal to that of an 
attorney privilege for a minimum requirement of devising a legal strategy. 
It was ruled by the court in Cosco v. Uuhoff, 195 F.3d 1221 (10" Cir. 1999) that it would have to be 
shown prison officials hindered an inmates effort in pursuing his legal claims. In this case, allowing 
Defendants to possess Appellants legal strategies in advance is a hindrance. Also, it can be proven that 
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Defendants have purposely delayed WL's specifically marked legal maiL7 Because ML is not an attorney, 
the prison does not consider legal mail sent to her as legal mail even when it is marked legal mail and 
inserted into the envelope in staffs presence as legal mail. 
Furthermore, in hindering Appellants claim a teacher from the prison's school (Not a correctional 
officer) was instructed to search WL's cell. WL was made to sit at a dayroom table in his underwear, and 
threatened with a DOR if he turned his head enough to view the search taking place. Appellants entire legal 
files were searched, examined and studied. It is unknown who else was going through the legal work, as a 
number of ICC employees were gathered around the door. (See Griffen v. Detella, 21 F.Supp 2d 843 (N.D. 
IL 1998)). Legal exhibits Appellant WL had prepared to send MI., were purposefully taken and destroyed. 
With the events and activities surrounding this case, Appellants loss of Consortium and any form of private 
communication, combined with the ICC search and destroy practice of legal exhibits amounts to a denial to 
access the courts and to fairly present a claim. 
Finally, by the Defendants denying visitation, they created a fmancial hardship for the Appellants, 
and financial gain for themselves. Defendants claim that even with the loss of visits, Appellants can: 
"...communicate with each other through letters, telephone calls, 
and through other visitors, " 
a. Letters and Mail 
When postage was $.40 for a letter, inmates could purchase a stamped envelope through commissary 
for $.50. As postage was recently changed to $.44 the cost of envelopes rose to $.60 a piece. But, if an 
inmate places more that 6 sheets of paper in the envelope it may be returned to them and the envelope is 
wasted.. Besides being much slower, getting the same amount of information and ideas sent by mail is even 
' The date prison staff signed forthe mail, and the date it was stamped leaving the prison was 24 days apart. 
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more expensive than that the phone system costs. 
Furthermore, sendmg ideas back and forth by mail can take weeks to formulate, develop, and create 
a legal paper. This method becomes useless when courts give limited days as timeframes for response. It 
severely hampers Appellants ability to present a claim, and creates an unfair advantage for the Defendants. 
b. Telephone calls 
Appellants are charged $3.80 per !4 hour to make a local telephone call to Boise. The ICC paralegal 
maintains the bare minimum requirements of legal books for inmate use. Any research or case law to 
support a claim, must be obtained then, from other sources outside the ICC law resource center. In another 
case Appellants have filed (No 35267-2008),WL received an order firom the Court of Appeals stating: 
"WHEREAS, Appellant is appearing in this uppeal pro se and is 
presently incarcerated and may not appear at oral argument as 
provided by Idaho Code Section 19-2803; therefore, IT IS ORDERED 
T M T  THIS APPEAL BE, AND HEREBY IS SUBMITTED FOR 
DECISION ON THE BRIEFS AND WITHOUT ORAL ARGUmNT. 
(Dated 14 September 2009). 
Because the entire case is dependant on written Briefs, good research is essential, and any research or 
case law must be obtained from other sources outside the ICC law research center. Giveii Idaho's present 
judicial policy and pmctice, District courts refuse to rule in favor of any inmate claim even when justice 
would so require. An inmate must go through the appeals process to gain any form of relief. This makes 
case law and research essential to any hope of success, and makes Appellants consortium of that much more 
importance. 
A prisoner who chooses to represent himself byJiling pro-se has a constitutional right to access law 
books or other tools to assist in preparing defenses, claims, or other issues. Bribiesca v. Galaza 21 5 F.3d 
1015 (9' Cir 2000). Because the ICC legal resource center does not have the other books needed, WL is 
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dependant on "other tools", such as consortium to help prepare their "claims or other issues". Recorded 
phone calls at $7.60 per hour, and photocopied mail do not fulfill the requirement. When filing as joint 
Pro Se Appellants, visitation time is needed to develop their claims. 
At ICC, inmate jobs pay approximately $25.00 to $30.00 a month. Only three (3) hours worth of 
phone calls and communication during the month costs $22.80. This leaves nothing for hygiene or other 
supplies. The financial cost to communicate without visitation hinders Appellants from being able to 
develop a proper claim. Because Appellants efforts are hindered, it must now be up to the appeals court to 
speculate what arguments could have been made or what strategy could have been used. Furthermore, 
unless financially rich, after what phone time is available has been used on legal work, there is no time left 
for the relationship that a maniage is based on. 
C. Contact throurh other visitors 
First of all, Appellants do not have other visitors, friends, or family that can assist in relaying legal 
information. The court should not require Appellants to be legally dependant on other untrained people. 
Other visitors would be unfamiliar with the case and arguments. Even if other visitors were available, 
Appellants case should not be dependant on what they would be able to remember to convey from Appellant 
to Appellant. 
ISSUE THREE 
DO MPELLANTS HAVE A LEGITMATE CLAIM FOR HARASSMENT AND 
RETALIATION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
' If a Deputy Attorney General made $100.00 per hour, a 40 hour work week would yield $4000.00. For the same percentages of 
income, it would cost the Deputy $507.00 for each '/2 phone call. If having to pay the same equivalency to which ICC charges, the 
Defendants would not l i e  relying on phone calls either 
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In early 1997 ML worked five (5) months for Swansons Corp. and made commissary deliveries to 
the various local IDOC prisons (ICC did not exist at that time). Desiring to build a relationship with WL, 
ML quit her job at Swansons commissary in August 1997. Five (5) months later ML and WL were married. 
Because ML had worked as a contract vendor at the prison, certain DOC officials opposed the marriage, 
aid harassment of the Appellants began. 
After Appellants were married on December 30, 1997 ML applied to visit, and was approved in 
January 1998, however after having only one (1) visit she was told they had made an error and her visits 
were terminated. 
In accordance with IDOC current P&P, and ex-employee or contract vender had to wait six (6) 
months from their last employment before being allowed to visiting a current inmate. Although Appellants 
had already waited six (6) months in an atypical decision, ML was told to wait another six (6) months. 
DOC decided to count from the time she applied, rather than from the date of her last employment as P&P 
stated. So Appellants did as asked and reapplied in June 1998. She was then approved. 
After just three (3) months, ML's visiting privileges were terminated again. The reason this time was 
that lDOC had conveniently rewritten the visiting policy stating: that all former contract vendors with 
visiting privileges would be terminated and could only be approved by the discretion of the warden. 
Although it was a new policy and violated expost facto law, it was retroactively applied to ML. 
Interestingly, there were several other women who temporarily lost their visiting, however, after 
appealing, they "all" were reinstated except for ML. Her visiting privileges were the only ones still being 
denied. This showed the prejudicial, biased, and disparate treatment that made this an atypical case. 
Appellants were forced to hired an attorney to represent them concerning this new DOC P&P. He 
arranged for a meeting with himself, MI,, Boma Miller (IDOC director at the time). The results of that 
meeting were that ML would be allowed to visit with no contact for one (1) year. Then, if there were no 
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problems regular visits would resume. When the restricted year was up, instead of receiving normal visits, 
WL was transferred on 25 July 2000 to the newly built ICC prison. ML put her application in to visit him 
there and was approved. However. after only two (2) visits, warden Klauser at ISCI contacted ICC and 
ML's visiting privileges were again terminated. - 
ICC officers were very prejudice towards sex offenders, and WL was placed in a unit where he was 
assaulted. He received a broken hand, a broken eye socket, cuts, and a severe concussion. Because of this 
attack, he was transferred to Orofmo on 10 October 2000. Un-hindered by the distance, ML drove around 
200 mile trip to Orofino every weekend and never missed a visit. Approximately six (6) months after WL's 
transferred realizing he was going to be kept there ML also relocated to save on travel time, and expenses. 
Although Appellants visits had been restricted a full year, being at a new institution, in another atypical 
decision their visits were again restricted for the "initial year". 
In July 2001, when DOC realized ML had permanently moved to Orofino they again transferred 
WL. This time, to Bonniville County jail in Idaho falls. When Appellants fought this new separation, and 
blatant harassment they filed 1983 action. WL was returned back to Orofino March 2002 and the 1983 was 
ruled moot.. Appellants were then allowed to visit until WL's release on parole in January 2004. 
After being returned to prison on a parole violation, Appellants continued to visit. WL's absconding 
did not affect ML's visiting at that time. After approximately three (3) months of visiting, serious 
harassment had begun, and was noted by Appellants in complaints and concern forms to IDOC and Warden 
Blades about the treatment they were receiving. (See Exhibits of complaints and DOR's). From September 
2005 until this current date November 2009, Appellants have been subjected to abuse and harassment fiom 
IDOC officials and ICC Officials with no penological reasoning behiid their decisions. And Appellants 
visiting is always the target and excuse used for terminating Appellants only treasured time together. 
B. ARGUMENT 
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It is obvious by the dates, transfers, and visiting restriction placed on the Appellants that 
harassment was taking place. Although filed a claim two (2) in this action it also remains unanswered! 
In the case of Gentala v. Citv of  Tucson, 213 F3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2000) the court ruled that the "loss 
o f a  first amendmentJi.eedom for even minimal period of time, constitutes "irreparable injury" for puyose 
of entitlement to injunctive relieJ " Defendants have been attempting to separate Appellants and interfering 
with their first amendment freedoms for years. When WL's parole was violated in October 2005, and he 
was re-incarcerated, the harassment continued. Separation could not be justifiably achieved directly through 
P&P so an indirect method of harassment and separation began. This harassment has been continually used 
to deceptively created a derogatory file which is now currently being used as a penological to not only deny 
Appellants visit, but any chance of further parole as well. 
Claim II of this action reads: "The termination of ML's visitingprivileges was notjust due to her 
previous arrest, but was aimed directly as a form of ongoing harassment and retaliation," (See record 
000013). The district court did not make an official ruling on Appellants claim. They did however ever 
make certain exterior surface statements surrounding the harassment claim (See record 000072-73). The 
Court mentioned items such as Appellants early visiting restrictions, tainted reports, and audacious write- 
ups of fictional nature. These, along with others, are disputed issues from which this claim stems. Yet, the 
court failed to specifically answer the claim itself. It is interesting, that in the courts reply, the defendants 
version of the disputed issues are simply accepted as fact and not left to the decision of a jury. These 
disputed issues include reports such as: 
"The Lightner's have a history of violating facility policies. On 
November 25, 2006, William Lightner accepted a visiting restriction when 
offered the choice of visitation or a DOR for violating the visitor contact 
rules ... " 
"On July 22, 2007 other visitors to the Idaho State Correctional 
Institute complained that Marcia Lightner was changing the order af the 
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visitors log and was dressed inappropriately" 
"On August 27, 2007 Marcia Lightner parked in an accessible space 
but failed to display her disabled identification permit." (see record 
00072-73) 
As the record has shown, the Order Granting Summary Judgment does briefly mention examples 
some of the controverter issues in its "Background" section but gives no W e r  evidence or d ing .  These 
events were totally fabricated and fictitiously documented. They unequivocally demonstrate the harassment 
focused toward Appellants. While these events were video recorded by institutional security cameras, and 
told to be saved by the deputy warden with a written Directive, Defendants claimed no videos exist in 
answering discovery. Meaning, that their sole source of evidence, which the court states as fwtual 
"Background" comes from manufactured and unhrthful documentation which they created. The recorded 
video, directed to be saved, has been accidentally lost. 
Meanwhile, Appellants have eyewitness testimony to present to a jury from other visitors who 
personally witnessed the events, and from other IDOC staff who recognized the harassment, and do not 
condone it. If Appellants were able to have a trial, these witnesses would testify under oath that Appellants 
were not disciplinary problems or security concerns. They will testify that ML's clothing was no different 
from that of anyone else's, and was not inappropriate, They will testify that correctional officers (CO's) 
keep maintain, and sustain the visiting ledgers, personally assigning tables to the visitors. That while 
entering with ML on the dates used by Defendants that the reported violations were impossible. ML could 
not, and did not make or change the visiting ledger while in the personal possession of CO's at all times. 
Other visitors will also testify of harassing comments and actions they witnessed which were directly aimed 
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unjustifiably towards Appellants which resulted in disciplinary  sanction^.^ 
This complaint and formal USCA 1983 action is the proper vehicle of relief for charges of 
harassment and retaliation. Unless the claim is simply approved and relief granted, Appellants have stated 
the claim and have demanded a trial: by jury. They have written documentation as evidence, and both 
visitors and other ISCI correctional staff as eye witnesses to testify. Any and all visitors documentation filed 
against ML were in fact just fabricated allegations. ML should have had the opportunity to face her accusers 
no matter how menial it may have seemed. If the issues were allegedly important enough to document and 
use, by IDOC then ML should have been given a due process hearing on them. 
The Supreme Court of the United States redefined the perimeters of liberty protection by stating in 
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct 2293 (1995) that sanctions by the DOC against inmates, which would occur 
during the normal course of confinement, are to be "expected for one serving" a sentence after conviction. 
In other words, the challenge to a denial of due process rests in the "Atypical v Typical" standard, which 
means that if the sanctions or conduct subjected to an inmate are de minims, which does not raise to the 
level of sufficient importance to be dealt with judicially, and the complained conduct could be expected to 
occur during the normal course of the incarceration, then the complaint many be dismissed. 
This case is atypical in nature and shows conduct by IDOC personal that is NOT to be expected for 
one serving a sentence. And, while Sandin went on to say that it was harmless error "UNLESS THE 
UNCONSTOITUTIONAL ACTION COULD BE REPETITWE" the harassment of the Appellants in this 
case has been constant and ongoing for twelve years. Although la* incarceration brings about necessary 
withdrawal of many privileges and rights, prisoners do not loose all their rights at the prison gates. 
Appellant ML is not a prisoner, she retains all her constitutional rights, and in fact, should have been 
9 However tragic, it must be noted that one of the greatest offending visiting Off~cers who harassed the Appellants, was in 
such a state of mind, that he took a handgun and committed suicide in the IDOC parking lot. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF-35- 
afforded her due process before her visiting was terminated. Also, because these accusations and attacks 
violated her person and character she was entitled to due process to defend herself. It is only due to the fact, 
that these infamies allegations are fictional that due process has been denied. 
The court held in Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F3d 103, 107 (2"d Cir. 1999) that when determining 
whether a disciplinary sanctions is atypical and significant, the district courts must review the particular 
conditions of confiiement to which the Appellant was subjected. It is clear, that a continuous pattern of 
harassment is visible. For Appellants to repeatedly be denied visiting for the same offence, or to be harassed 
over a past employment or twelve years (12) is atypical. Additionally, to have visiting privileges 
permanently terminated is significant. For the district court to not address the issue and even respond to the 
claim is grounds for appeal, reversal, and remand. 
In 1995 the 9" Cir. Ruled in Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F3d 912 the prisoner's allegation that a 
correctional officer cited him for a disciplinary violation because of his prior litigation activities, would 
violate the equal protection clause. Any corroborating affidavits by fellow prisoners creates a fact issue 
which precludes summary judgment. Appellants have asked for a trial by jury to include not only testimony 
of other inmates, but of other visitors, and IDOC correctional staff as well. Furthermore, by the Defendants 
failure to show a penological need for the atypical treatment, the court should have denied the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and schedule a date for trial by jury. 
A prison regulation may infringe or threaten an inmates constitutional interest as applies to a 
particular protected expression only if the regulation is legitimately related to penological goals or interests. 
Muruhv v. Shaw, 195 F3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) One example of an issue in controversy is that of ML's 
handicap parking permit. Defendant's record a parking incident as a log entry of misconduct (see record 
000073) Appellant's used this same incident as an example of harassment from which no legitimate 
penological interest can be shown. It is the courts duty and jury's decision to now balance the importance of 
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Appellants infringed right against the importance of the penological interest. Muruhv Id.. The court cannot 
just automatically accept Defendants response as justifiably true and dismiss the action without balancing 
the facts. The court must supplement this with a formal decision and answer to the claim. 
Being handicapped, ML parked in the same handicapped visiting spot, two to three times each week 
at ISCI. The institution knew she had a handicapped permit. On 27 August 2007, just minutes after 
visiting began, ML was told her visits that af3ernoon were being terminated for being parked in an 
unauthorized parking space. She was told that her permit was not on her mirror and visible for the tower to 
see. However, there are no laws specifying where the permit has to be located. Her visits sere being 
terminated because the permit was placed in the front window, over the dash instead of being hung from the 
rearview mirror. When ML appealed to the Sgt. at visiting she was told her visits were terminated and asked 
to leave and tlie incident report was written and logged in Appellants visiting file. The placement of the 
permit had no penological value other than a method in which to harass the Appellants. 
It was this type of behavior the Gatala Court condemned. If ISCI officials knew ML had a handicap 
permit, to referenced it in their report, then it is clear there intent was only for harassment purposes. Since 
ML had visited for months at the institution with the disabled permit always displayed in the same manner, 
that days eviction can only be taken as prejudicial, harassing treatment. Without penological interest or 
security concerns, the placement of the permit in the window was being used simply to terminate Appellants 
visits that day. This is harassment, and a Fist Amendment deprivation 
Although many other examples and incidents of harassment can be shown which would he presented 
to a jury, Appellants would like to point out that in their PRAYER FOR RELJEF they specifically requested: 
(see record 0000 17) 
"A. That while incarcerated, William Lightner if41438 will not be 
moved from his current housing assignment. I f  he is again moved, it 
would have to be taken as a serious form ofretaliation due to the filing of 
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this lawsuit. William Lightner is safe and doing well at his current 
housing assignment. " 
When this case was filed, WL had a full-time job working as the senior tutor in education. Because 
of this job, and his seniority, he had earned the right to be housed in a single cell. In fear of continued 
harassment and retaliation, WL request not to be moved in his prayer for relief (See record 000003 and 
000042). This action was amended and filed on 21 April 2008. Soon after this filing in district court 
was moved on 1 May 2008. He was for no penological reason sent back to ICC, an institution no inmate 
likes to be housed at. The institution where assaults are prevalent and where he had been attacked in the 
past. Both his single cell and his job were taken away without cause or institutional need. Furthermore, 
upon arriving at ICC, his file miraculously was misplaced. So upon arriving at ICC, he was informed 
placement could not be calculated and he was placed in Ad-seg. Being sent from a single cell with a full 
time job the hole at ICC for filing this action in the court is retaliation. 
ISSUE FOUR 
DID THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY. AND SHOULD 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A RULING ON THIS ISSUE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On or about April 12 2007 ML's visiting was terminated. Then after writing a letter appealing the 
termination to Warden Blades, approved the request. He asked that ML keep ISCI appraised on the changes 
in her case, and reinstated Appellants visiting. Three months, later warden Hardison took over as new 
warden at ISCI replacing Blades. During the three month reinstatement, there were no new issues, concerns, 
or complaints relating to their visiting. Neither had anything new in ML's case occurred to report on. She 
was still awaiting the pre-trial date to arrive. 
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When Hardison took over as warden he reversed warden Blade's decision and terminated Appellants 
visiting for the same issue they had been terminated for 12 April 2007. 10 
B. ARGUMENT 
Appellants argue that the lower courts dismissal of this case should be reversed and remanded, in 
that neither the Defendants nor the court responded to or ruled on claim three (3) of this action. Appellants 
fded a 42 USC 1983 Civil Rights Complaint on 14 January 2008 (See record 000007). This complaint was 
amended on other grounds on 16 June 2008 (see record 00003 1). Both the initial and amended complaints 
contain an identical Claim III. This Claim stated: 
"The Lightner's visits were suspended for four (4) months in April for 
Marcia's arrest. To now suspend them again for the same arrest is 
Double Jeopardy: (See record 000040) 
The Idaho State Constitution Article 13 is very similar to the Double Jeopardy clause in the Bill of 
Rights, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence ". When M L  was arrested in April 
2007, her visiting privileges were suspended. This suspension lasted four (4) months, Appellants lost 
forty one (41) visits during that termination period. The loss of privileges is a universal method all prisons 
use as punishment. Upon appeal, warden Randy Blades ended that punishment and reinstated ML's 
visiting privileges. 
10 As a special note upon which Appellants ask the court to examine with Judicial notice is a new recent offence against 
Appellants visiting status. Upon WL's transfer to ICC, Appellants visiting privileges were again approved. According to policy 
and procedure, each visitor has to renew their application on a yearly basis. When ML filed her yearly renewal, she was once 
again denied for the same April 2007 arrest. This made the third time ML's visits were terminated for the same offence. A 
liberty interest was created when visits were approved for the initial year. In addition, the years supervised probation for the 
"MisdemeanoZ' conviction has been concluded. As this fact was pointed out and proven during the grievance process, a new 
reason for ML's termination was given. Now ML's visits have been atypically denied on a permanent basis, because she 
worked for Swanson's commissary twelve (12) years ago. ML never worked at ICC, it was not even built in 1997. When 
warden Valdez and IDOC officials terminated ML's visiting he did so permanently, (as he told ML, "forever") and a permanent 
suspension fiom visiting is a&p&.& Of special noting, and reason for Judicial Notice is that to now be suspended a third time 
for the same offense is also atypical. 
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As the original suspension was lifted Appellants excised their re-established liberty interest in 
visiting as the visiting schedule allowed. Unfortunately, in this case, the loss of privileges was repeated, 
as a "jeopardy" used as punishment, when warden Hardison suspended Appellant's visiting privileges a 
second time for the same offence. 
Defendants responded to both Appellants initial filing (see record 000021) and lo the amended filing 
of the civil rights complaint. They also submitted a memorandum in support of their motion for Summary 
Judgment. Yet, in all these responses, they failed to even mention Appellants Claim Dl. 
Defendants did not deny or rebut the Double Jeopardy claim Appellants filed when tbis case was 
brought before the district court for oral argument. At that hearing, ML stated that she was told personally 
by warden Hardison that her visits were being suspended "Because of her arrest". When it was his turn to 
speak, WL pointed out the fact that Defendants did not respond to the Double Jeopardy claim in the 
complaint. M e r  his oration and conversation with the court concluded, Defendants were given a chance to 
respond. Counsel for Defendants stated: 
"...As far as the Double Jeopardy claim, I think the case law will bear out quite 
clearly that that provision, that constitutional provisions only applies in criminal 
proceedings. The termination of their visiting privileges was an administrative 
proceeding, and therefore, the double jeopardy claim is inapplicable. " (See 
record transcripts of 14 November 2008 hearing, pages 54,71-72 with Defendants 
response on page 28) 
Appellants do not see anywhere in the Bill of Rights that certain Amendments only apply to criminal 
cases. To name a few, there are Amendments guaranteeing the right to freedom of speech and religion, the 
right to vote and to bear arms, and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Are these all 
criminal cases? If Appellants were awarded financial compensation on this claim, using the logic that 
double jeopardy only applies to criminal cases, it would only make sense to file it again and again for 
repeated civil compensation claims. What could Defendants argue? By the law of resjudicata they would 
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have no argument on the settled issue . With no Double Jeopardy, they would just have to pay over and over 
and over again for the same "civil" offence and "administrative proceeding". 
Furthermore, not only did Defendants fail to respond, but the Court also failed to respond to the 
double jeopardy claim as well. The Court gave no oral response at the hearing, neither did they respond in 
the written Order. Claim III remains unanswered. Appellants feel that it is their Constitutional right to have 
each of their claims answered. Not just the ones Defendants feel like responding to. 
It is clear from the Courts decision and Order that the Defendants memorandum was used to create 
that Order. It is almost a replica. It follows the same pattern, uses the same sequential issues, and the same 
supporting case law the Defendants used in their Memorandum. Unfortunately, it also bypasses the same 
claims. Appellants request that the court responds to Claim ID. A positive reply in which relief can be 
granted, or a negative reply to Claim III, which can be appealed, must be given. The district court, in 
making its Order, should have been responding to the claims in Appellants action, rather than re-quoting 
Defendants response. Appellants have had their visits suspended a number of times for the same alleged 
offence in an atypical fashion. This is exactly the type of government behavior the Double Jeopardy 
Amendment condemned. The claim deserves a response from the Court 
CONCLUSION 
Prejudicial is not uncommon in the prison system. While society is pushed toward integration, 
prison life is run by separation. Race, Religion and many other things create an inmates standing. It is no 
secret that WL was classified as a VSP. And this is combined with the fact that he married an ex-contract 
vender, certain prejudicial IDOC and employees targeted Appellants for harassment. In the case of 
Whitmire v. Arizona, 230 F Supp 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y.2002) The homosexual partner of a state prisoner 
brought an action against a state corrections department, alleging the department's regulation prohibiting 
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same sex kissing and hugging among non-fhmily members during prison visits violated the equal protection 
clause The district court dismissed the action, but the appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals 
court held that dismissal on the pleadings was not warranted absent corroborating evidence of a rational 
connection between the regulation and an asserted correctional safety interest. The appeals court held that 
the partner had standing to challenge the regulation. The court found no common-sense connection between 
the regulation and the asserted safety interest. Likewise comma, Appellants have been targeted by IDOC 
officials since they were married. With the negative media attention both Appellants have suffered 
violations. 
When ML's visiting was suspended by Defendants, it was not the first time. ML has been 
continually harassed and suspended since they were married. But there comes a time when this harassment 
and prejudicial treatment must end. In filing this complaint Appellants were denied counsel. It is unknown 
what kind of claim could have been filed with competent attorneys. Nevertheless, Defendants have tried to 
avoid the issues and direct the courts attention in other directions. Two of the three issues claimed remained 
unanswered, as the court did reply to each new issue created by the defense. 
Avoiding the interest of justice, Appellants claims were dismissed because WL did not complete his 
grievance procedure that does not exist in P&P. Should he have followed the normal procedure as 
Defendants claim it would have violated the written Directives. The grievance system is not meant to give 
the same person who answered the concern a chance to reconsider or change his mind. Can an inmate say, 
"I didn't mean to forge that check or pull that trigger. Give me a change to change my mind." 
Appellants rights were violated in that punishment was handed out without giving them a due 
process hearing. They were not allowed to call witnesses, or to rebut testimony or evidence used against 
them. Neither were they allowed to provide evidence in their on behalf. They were denied the basic right of 
confronting their accusers. While WL does loose any of his at the prison gate, due process is not one of 
APPELLANTS BRIEF-42- 
them. Furthermore, offense was issued against ML, who is not an inmate and retains all her rights. 
When Appellants Consortium was denied Defendants also effectively hindered their right to access 
the court. The use of mail and telephones is not only extreme expensive, but it gives Defendants an d k i r  
advantage. It allows them recorded access to Appellants strategies. History records show that President 
Nixon was convicted in Water Gate. How politically small does a person need to be before their rights don't 
matter. And they no longer can pursue the right of happiness? 
Because of the nature of WL's criminal charge, certain select IDOC officials targeted him for 
harassment. Coupled with a VSP label this harassment escalated the rights violations. Married to WL, ML 
has had to endure and suffer the same harassment and haltered from which hate crimes stem. This issue is 
not restricted to this case alone. In the distant past, society went on which hunts trying to destroy anyone 
they could place in that category. In today's society it is sex offenders. The classification may be different, 
but the results are the same. Those classified as sex offenders are harassed and undergo all forms of 
mistreatment. 
Lastly, Appellants have claimed Double Jeopardy violation. Over the course of their marriage visits 
have been repeatedly interrupted. In this case, ML's visits were suspended when she was arrested in April 
2007. As a result of that arrest she missed 41 visits before being allowed to see her husband. After visiting 
resumed and a Liberty Interest was created ML's visiting privileges were three months later suspended again 
for the same offense. This suspension lasted until WL was transferred to ICC. 
AAer a M l  year of visits, ML's privileges were suspended for the third time. Double jeopardy 
usually can be inferred for "twice" being put in jeopardy for the same offense. With the recent suspension it 
is now three times. Appellants have had their visits suspended for the same arrest. 
In closing, Appellants refer to the courts ruling in, Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp 412 (W.D. NC 1974) 
The Court held that interference with communication between inmate and his or her spouse may be 
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unconstitutional as an infringement of rights of farnily relationship and privacy attached to activities relating 
to the family. 
I Based on the above, Appellants seek justice in rhis mtter that their visiting will be reinstated. 
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Respectfully Submitted this L d a y  of November 2009. 
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